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Income comparisons are important for individual well-being. We examine the shape of the 
relationship between relative income and life satisfaction, and test empirically if the features 
of the value function of prospect theory carry on to experienced utility. We draw on a 
unique dataset for a middle-income country, that allows us to work with an endogenous 
reference income, which differs for individuals with the same observable characteristics, 
depending on the perception error about their relative position in the distribution. We find 
the value function for experienced utility to be concave for both positive and, at odds with 
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income comparisons, people with different personality traits, or social beliefs.
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1 Introduction
We know from happiness economics that relative income matters. As convincingly argued
by an increasing number of economists, this inuences individual behaviour (Frank, 1985),
causes welfare losses (Frank, 2005), and it is also relevant for public policy, such as opti-
mal taxation (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Oswald, 1983; Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013).
Own income relative to the average income of a social reference group has been found to
have a sizable eect on individual well-being: Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), for instance, nds
relative income to be as important as absolute income. Furthermore, as suggested by Due-
senberry's (1949) relative income hypothesis, relative income matters more for people with
relative deprivation (lower income than the group's average) than for those with relative
auence. With very few notable exceptions, pioneered by Vendrik and Woltjer (2007),
the relationship between relative income and subjective well-being has been assumed to
be linear. Despite this usual (but unfounded) practice in empirical work, this functional
form may not be the best choice to capture the salient features of the relationship between
relative income and experienced utility.
In widening the possible applications of Prospect Theory to riskless choices, Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) argue that the average income of the reference group represents the
natural comparison point for each person to value their income. In doing so, they establish
a bridge between their original contributions in decision making under uncertainty and the
research in economics (and other social sciences) that assumes or accepts interdependence
of preferences and incorporates relative concerns into individuals' objective function.
The prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) contends that when
agents make decisions based on a value function that reects their expected utility, they
value the options with respect to a reference point. This function has several features,
which distinguish it from conventional decision making models: (a) reference dependence,
which postulates that the well-being depends more on income relative to a reference point
than on its level in absolute terms; (b) the asymmetric valuation between gains and losses,
which states that the intensity of the valuation of a loss is greater than that of a gain of
equal magnitude; (c) the principle of diminishing sensitivity, which implies that the value
function may be convex in the area of losses and concave in gains; (d) reection eect,
which postulates equal degree of concavity and convexity; (e) loss aversion, which implies
that the value function is stepper in losses than in gains; and (f) subjective probabil-
ity assessments, that states that under uncertainty people weight their options based on
subjective distribution functions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and 2000).
These fundamental characteristics of the utility function of prospect theory have been ex-
tensively examined in the lab using expected utility, the utility concept for which prospect
theory was originally conceived. As outlined above, the empirical literature that uses self-
reported life satisfaction as an empirical measure of experienced utility has long corrobo-
rated Tversky and Kahneman's (1991) argument about the pertinence of relative income
as a benchmark to assess the value of own income. The question that arises, then, is
2
whether the features that characterize the value function of expected utility are also useful
to characterize the utility function with experienced utility.
This paper addresses this question using a new and unique panel dataset for a middle-
income country (Uruguay), which includes information on personality traits and individual
beliefs. We examine whether the basic properties of the value function of prospect theory
carry over to experienced utility by allowing the value function to be non-linear. In the
only paper that estimates a non-linear relationship between experienced utility and relative
income, Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) conrm, using data for Germany, asymmetric eects
for positive and negative relative income. They also nd life satisfaction to be concave
in positive relative income, but in contrast to prospect theory, also in negative relative
income, which in turn implies loss aversion, in a wide sense.
Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) suggest that the contradiction between their ndings and
prospect theory could be due to their exogenous denition of reference income, which
assume that individuals with similar observable characteristics have the same reference
group. We improve the denition of reference income in two ways. First, in line with Van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008), which suggest that individuals assign much weight
to individuals from their reference group who are nearby socially speaking, and related to
feature (f) above, we use neighbourhoods, that is, very small geographical areas, to dene
reference groups. Second, we also take into account that reference group selection may be
a source of bias in the individual assessment of their own income (Kapteyn et al., 1978;
Cruces et al., 2013), and assume that those biases are related to the dierence between
the reference income of an exogenously dened group and the true reference income of the
individual. This introduces heterogeneity in the reference income among individuals with
similar observable characteristics.
Our estimates corroborate that income comparisons are not symmetric. They are more
important for relative deprivation than for relative auence. In line with the ndings of
Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) for Germany, we also nd the relationship between relative
income and life satisfaction in Uruguay to be concave both for relative auence and relative
deprivation, which is at odds with the principle of diminishing sensitivity (c) of prospect
theory. Finally, loss aversion is only satised for incomes that are suciently distant from
the reference income.
These ndings apply on average to the whole sample. However, there are many reasons
to believe that dierent population subgroups may have dierent value functions. We
shall explore three factors: (i) intensity of comparisons, as not everyone gives the same
importance to income comparisons (Clark and Senik, 2010); (ii) personality traits, as they
have been found to mediate in the relationship between relative income and life satisfaction
(Proto and Rustichini, 2015; Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2017)); and (iii) social beliefs,
as people's beliefs about how society works are important drivers of individuals' preferences
and behaviour (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Heterogeneity does not change the shape of
the value function, which is always found concave for the full support of relative incomes,
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but aects the slopes of the value function of the dierent groups.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the rst study to provide
evidence on the prospect theory hypotheses with experience utility for a middle-income
country, and one of the few studies addressing the relevance of relative income for life
satisfaction. Our nding of a concave value function for negative relative incomes suggests
that the costs of social participation are increasing with relative deprivation in Uruguay
(Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007). We also improve the denition of reference income in two
ways: we endogenize reference income and reference groups are comprised by individuals
who are socially nearby the individual. Finally, we examine heterogeneous eects for the
rst time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and describes the
hypotheses we are taking to the data. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy: introduces
the power-function specication we use, describes the empirical test of our hypotheses, and
puts forth a new reference income variable that takes into account individual's perception
about her own position in the income distribution. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy
to take the prospect theory hypotheses to the data, describes the endogenous reference
groups, and discusses the salient features of our data, the Multidimensional Well-being
Trajectories in Childhood survey. Section 4 presents our main results for the whole sample
and provides heterogeneity analysis by comparison intensity, personality traits, and social
beliefs. Finally, Section 5 provides arguments to explain the estimated concavity of the
value function, discusses the implications of such concavity, and concludes.
2 Hypotheses
We test four basic assumptions about the functional form of relative concern used in the
value function proposed by prospect theory.
Hypothesis HI: (Asymmetry of comparisons). The valuations with respect to relative
income are asymmetric.
This rst hypothesis presupposes reference dependence i.e. that relative income and hence
reference groups are relevant and suggests that the same relative distance to the reference
income has a dierential eect on satisfaction depending on what side of the reference
income individuals are located, that is, on whether relative income is positive or negative.
The hypothesis is thus related to the asymmetric valuation between gains and losses hy-
pothesis (b) from prospect theory. Empirical evidence in support for this hypothesis was
rst provided by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), drawing on data from the German SOEP and
using a linear specication for relative income. Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) corroborate
such asymmetry of comparisons with a power-function specication and the same data for
Germany.
Hypothesis HII: (Diminishing sensitivity). The marginal sensitivity of the utility func-
tion to relative income has an asymmetric shape, being convex for individuals with relative
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deprivation and concave for those with a positive relative income.
The second hypothesis is the equivalent to the diminishing sensitivity hypothesis in prospect
theory, which postulates convexity in losses and concavity in gains that is, that people
are more sensitive to changes near their status quo than to changes far from their status
quo. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence in support of diminishing sen-
sitivity with respect to the reference income of a relevant reference group. Vendrik and
Woltjer (2007) is the only paper we know of that tests this hypothesis in the context of
experienced utility and social comparisons and nd concavity both in positive as well as
negative relative incomes.
Hypothesis HIII: (Equal degree of convexity and concavity). The degree of convexity for
individuals with relative deprivation is the same as the degree of concavity for individuals
with positive relative income.
The third hypothesis is equivalent to the reection eect in prospect theory, which pos-
tulates equal degree of convexity in losses and concavity in gains. Such symmetry results
from assuming that people focus on the numbers indicating a scale's value without con-
cern for the unit or physical meaning of the scale (Wakker et al., 2007), that is, from
the so-called numerosity eect. Studies on decision utility nd evidence in support of the
reection eect (Kahneman, 2003).
Economists assume decreasing marginal utility of income, which reinforces the concavity
in gains but reduces the convexity in losses, making it closer to linearity. Put together,
the general psychological perceptions determined by the nominal value of money and the
economic assumption determined by the intrinsic value of money, predict a larger degree of
concavity in gains than convexity in losses. Wakker et al. (2010) call it partial reection.
As noted above, there is no evidence for experienced utility consistent with diminishing
sensitivity. Notwithstanding this, Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) nd larger degrees of concav-
ity for positive relative income than for negative relative income. This could be interpreted
as the economic intrinsic eect of money outweighing the psychological numerosity eect.
Hypothesis HIV: (Loss aversion). Changes in relative income have a greater impact for
those who face relative deprivation than for those who have a positive relative income.
The fourth hypothesis informs about the relative size of the eect of comparisons. In par-
ticular, it postulates that the negative eect on satisfaction of negative relative income for
poorer individuals is larger than the eect of positive relative income of richer individuals.
In the context of prospect theory, it is similar to loss aversion. Again, Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2005) and Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), among others, nd evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. Furthermore, they also nd downward comparisons of richer individuals with
positive relative income not to inuence their satisfaction.1
1Some papers test this hypothesis with respect to own income gains and losses over time, nding mixed
evidence. For instance, while Di Tella et al. (2010) and Boyce et al. (2016) for nd evidence in support
for loss aversion for Germany and the UK, Fang and Niimi's (2015) ndings for Japan do not support loss
aversion for own income gains and losses over time. Notwithstanding this, the latter reports evidence in




We use a satisfaction variable, S, as a proxy measure of utility. The validity of satisfaction
variables has been discussed in Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Clark et al. (2008), and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2011). Since we want to test the importance and shape of relative
income eects at either side of a reference income level, our baseline model relaxes the
logarithmic functional form of both absolute and relative income, which is the standard
specication with satisfaction equations, and uses instead a more exible parametric power-
functions, h(·), to capture the absolute and relative income eects on satisfaction:
S = α+ βh(y) + γ+h(G
+)(I) + γ−h(G−)(1− I) + δX + e (1)
where y is household income, the vector X includes relevant controls and the Greek letters
are parameters to be estimated. I is an indicator function, which equals 1 when (y−yrg) ≥ 0
and 0 when (y − yrg) < 0. This specication falls within the models that Hopkins (2008)
classies as mean dependence, which assume that utility increases with income in absolute
terms, but also with respect to income relative to a reference point. Some studies employ
income ranks to model relative concern see, for instance, Clark et al. (2009). This
is however not a good option for us, as we want to study how satisfaction responds to
variations in the size of the relative income gap.
We dene income relative to the reference's group average income level, yrg in percentage
terms, and thus dene G+ = (y − yrg/yrg) > 0 and G− = (yrg − y/yrg) > 0. Gains
and losses are dened in absolute terms in prospect theory, i.e. (y − yrg) (Tversky and
Kanheman, 1991). However, as Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) argue, relative distances to the
reference value seem more relevant determinants of satisfaction than absolute gains and
losses.
Previous empirical studies typically nd a positive relationship between relative income
and life satisfaction. Since we dene both G+ and G− as non-negative, we expect γ+ ≥ 0
and γ− < 0.























3.2 Specication tests for our hypotheses
The four hypotheses outlined in section 2 have implications on the parameters of interest
in equations (1)-(4), which can be tested. The asymmetry of comparisons hypothesis (HI)
implies the absolute values of parameters γ+ and γ− in equation 1 to dier: (|γ+| 6= |γ−|).
The following two hypotheses address the possible non-linearity of relative income eects
and also involve parameters ρ+ and ρ−. Diminishing sensitivity (HII) implies convexity for
individuals facing relative deprivation and concavity for individuals with positive relative
income. Convexity requires a positive second derivative of S with respect to G−, which is
obtained with parameters γ− and ρ− of opposite sign, i.e. either γ− > 0 and ρ− < 0 or
γ− < 0 and ρ− > 0. Concavity requires a negative second derivative of S with respect to
G+, which is obtained with parameters γ+ and ρ+ of the same sign, i.e. either γ+ > 0 and
ρ+ > 0 or γ+ < 0 and ρ+ < 0.
Hypothesis HIII requires measuring the degree of concavity and convexity. Given our
power function specication, we use ρ+ and ρ− for that purpose, which resembles Pratt's
measure of relative risk aversion. Then equal degree of concavity for relative deprivation
and convexity for relative advantage implies |ρ+| = |ρ−|.
Finally, loss aversion (HIV) may be tested in two dierent ways. One rst (and more
global) strategy is to check whether the slope is steeper for relative deprivation than for
relative advantage, for the same gap, i.e. G+ = G−. A second, more local, strategy is
to check whether there is a kink in the slope of the value function at the reference level,
i.e. G+ = G− = 0, with a steeper slope for relative deprivation (Kahneman et al., 1991;
Köbberling and Wakker, 2005).
The rst strategy concerns parameters γ+ and γ−, but also ρ+ and ρ−, since ∂S/∂G+ =
γ+ (1 +G
+)
−ρ+ and ∂S/∂G− = γ− (1 +G−)
−ρ− . Loss aversion is fullled if the value
function is concave and smooth in both G− and G+, as in Vendrik and Woltjer (2007).
This, of course, means that hypothesis HII does not hold. If hypothesis HII holds, however,
and the value function is convex for relative deprivation, loss aversion depends on the
particular values of γ+ and ρ+ relative to γ− and ρ−, and of G+ = G− in a complex way.
Since the second strategy evaluates the slope of the value function at G+ = G− = 0, it
simply implies (|γ+| < |γ−|). Previous evidence suggest relative income is not relevant for
individuals with a relative advantage (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Thus, we will also test
whether γ+ = 0.
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3.3 Endogenous Reference Groups
The above model assumes that the researcher knows the income of the reference group Yrg.
However, determining the reference income is the most problematic aspect of prospect the-
ory (de Meza and Webb, 2007). The literature is inconclusive about how reference groups
are formed and generally assume that individuals compare themselves with other individ-
uals who share observable characteristics (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2011; Vendrik and Woltjer,
2007), thus assuming that individuals with similar observable characteristics have the same
reference group. However, aspects such as individual social mobility, social interactions,
the presence of information problems, copying strategies, or misperceptions about one's rel-
ative position may also explain individual's choice of reference group and thus of reference
point (Falk and Knell, 2004; Stutzer, 2004; Clark and D'Angelo, 2013). If so, the standard
practice of using basic socio-economic observable characteristics to dene reference groups
would not provide an accurate estimate of each individual's reference income, casting thus
doubt on our ndings about the validity of the assumptions of prospect theory.
We address this issue by using a denition of reference income that depends on individuals'
own perception of outcomes. This introduces heterogeneity in the reference income among
individuals with similar observable characteristics. We explore the idea that individuals
assess their own situation by comparing it with the perceived distribution of outcomes
(Kapteyn et al., 1978). To this end, we rst assume that the reference group based on
observable characteristics (yrg−observedi ) provides relevant, but insucient information, as
it may dier from what each individual really considers when making their valuations





to the biases in individuals' evaluations of their own relative position in the overall income
distribution.
Let the perception error of an individual's i own relative position in the income distribution,
(ei), be the dierence between her perceived position (PiP ) and the true position (PiT ) in
the income distribution, epi = Pi
P −PiT . Following the evidence provided in Kapteyn et al.
(1978) and Cruces et al. (2013), we assume that biased perceptions of own relative position
depend on the reference group and the resulting threshold taken as a reference. The
richer the reference group, and thus the higher the reference income, the more individuals
underestimate their relative position in the overall income distribution. Table Appendix
I.2 provides empirical support to this assumption for the MWTC data.













1 if PPi = P
T
i
> 1 if PPi > P
T
i




where ψ(ei) > 0, ψ(0) = 1, and ψ′(ei) > 0. That is, individuals' reference income is
adjusted only if their perceptions about their own position in the income distribution
are not correct. Overestimating one's position, i.e. (PPi > P
T
i ), leads to a downward
adjustment in own reference income, while the opposite happens when one's position is
underestimated. For the empirical analysis we use the following functional form of ψ(ei):
ψ(ei) =
 1 if PPi = P Ti1 + ePi if PPi 6= P Ti
where both perceived and true positions, PiP and PiT , are measured in deciles and take
values from 0.1 to 1.2
However, results are robust to other functional forms of ψ(ei), such as the square root of the
error, which gives less importance to greater perception errors, or to dierent denitions
of the perception error, such as the ratio between true income and that of the decile where
individuals perceive themselves to be.
Using subjective perception errors to adjust reference incomes may raise endogeneity con-
cerns, as we are introducing subjective aspects among the regressors. However, since
subjective perceptions only enter the righ-hand side variables indirectly and we are also
using xed eects, which controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we believe
such concerns should not be serious.
3.4 Data
Our data comes from the "Multidimensional Well-being Trajectories in Childhood" (MWTC),
a unique panel data set, which includes a wide set of individual socioeconomic character-
istics, as well as individual perceptions and opinions, which are important for our analysis
and are not usually found in surveys that are representative of large populations. The
MWTC is representative of the households residing in the metropolitan area with children
attending the rst year at a public primary school in 2004.3 Public school coverage is close
to 90% among rst-year school children in Uruguay.4
2As the variable of the perception of own position in the distribution is only available in the third wave,
we assume that the error is constant between 2006 and 2011.
3The metropolitan area includes Montevideo and Canelones, and accounts for 54% of the entire popu-
lation.
4Original sample sizes are 1800 households in 2004, 1327 in 2006, and 1084 in 2011. It is worth noting
that top income households are underrepresented in the MWTC sample. See Burstin et al. (2010) for
further details about the MWTC data.
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We use data from the last two waves of the survey, corresponding to the years 2006 and
2011, as the rst wave does not include information on life satisfaction, our dependent
variable. Our sample includes 1629 individuals, of which 1278 are respondents of the 2006
wave and 1070 come from the 2011 wave. The panel component includes 722 individuals
who provided answers in both waves. This is the sample we use for the panel data analysis.
It is worth noting that our longitudinal sample does not seem to be a self-selected sample,
since the mean values of the main variables are not statistically dierent for the dierent
samples at conventional signicant levels (see summary statistics and dierence-in-means
tests in Table Appendix I.3 in Appendix A.I).5 The description and source of each variable
is provided in Table Appendix I.1 in Appendix A.I.
Our dependent variable is reported individual life satisfaction, S, which following Vendrik
and Woltjer (2007) we interpret as a measure of experienced utility.6 The income vari-
able measures real annual disposable household income, which includes labour and capital
income net of taxes and transfers.7
As explained in section 3.3, reference income is the income of a relevant reference group,
adjusted by individual's own perception error about their position in the income distribu-
tion. Unlike previous studies, instead of using broad regions to dene reference groups, we
use much ner geographical areas, namely neighbourhood of residency, which we believe
dene more relevant reference groups.8
To estimate the reference income of the groups we use the whole cross-section sample of
the MWTC, which is larger than the panel sample. Our set of controls is standard and
includes age, hours worked, and number of adults in the household, all in logarithms,
and marital status, number of children, labour market status, number of active household
members, as categorical variables, a dummy for the capital city Montevideo, and year xed
eects. Time-invariant variables such as education, cognitive, and non-cognitive skills are
subsumed in the individual xed eect. Table Appendix I.1 shows the precise denition of
all variables.
3.5 Estimation procedure
In accordance to a substantial part of the empirical literature, we do not use ordinal models
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), but non-linear least squares with xed individual
5The only exceptions are sex and hours worked for the rst wave and years of education, age and sex
for the second wave.
6Life satisfaction questions have also been considered a measure of remembered utility by Kahneman
and Krueger (2006). In agreement with Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), we prefer to interpret it as experience
utility since it is an assessment about how people experience their life.
7The average of our income variable is consistent with the larger and representative Continuous House-
hold Survey, which is run by the National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay.
8People tend to compare themselves to similar others (Falk and Knell, 2004), and we argue that resi-
dential choice also captures unobserved individual characteristics that are relevant to dene the group of
similar others. Moreover, the behaviour, haves, and have-nots of neighbours is more readily observed and
thus more likely to exert a larger inuence than that of individuals that one never comes across but are
nevertheless living in the same administrative region.
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eects. This assumes interpersonal comparability and cardinality,9 but provides a simpler
interpretation of the coecients of interest i.e. those associated with relative concern.
Since xed eect models use only within-individual variation to estimate the regression
coecients and do not use information about interpersonal variation, our estimates do
not require the assumption of interpersonal comparability of economic satisfaction scales,
but only require the intertemporal cardinal comparability of the responses (Vendrik and
Woltjer, 2007). Furthermore, xed eects control for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity, which is key when modelling self-reported satisfaction levels (Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters, 2004)
As outlined above, a source of simultaneity and bias lies in the choice of the reference
group (Falk and Knell, 2004; Heetz and Frank, 2011). On the one hand, the reference
group may be relevant in deciding how much income is necessary to obtain a certain
level of economic satisfaction, but on the other hand, individuals may choose the reference
group endogenously in order to maximize economic satisfaction see Falk and Knell (2004),
Senik (2009), and Clark and Senik (2010) for evidence on the endogenous determination of
reference groups. Notwithstanding this, reference groups are usually assumed exogenous
in the empirical literature (Clark et al., 2008). As explained in sections 3.3 and 3.4, to
address this issue, we introduce two novelties: we use neighbourhood of residency to dene
the reference groups and use individual perceptions about own relative position in the
income distribution to correct the reference income from endogeneity biases (Kapteyn et
al., 1978; Cruces et al., 2013)
4 Testing the assumptions of prospect theory
Section 4.1 reports and discusses our main ndings on the four basic assumptions about the
functional form of relative concern used in the value function proposed by prospect theory
presented in Section 2, while Section 4.2 explores to what extent individual attributes and
characteristics introduce heterogeneity in the functional form of relative concern.
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 reports estimates of the main parameter of interest from our exible model outlined
in equations (1)-(4), which allow us to test empirically hypothesis HI to HIV. The full set
of estimates of model (1)-(4) is reported in Appendix Table Appendix I.5. The estimates
of γ+ and γ− indicate that income comparisons are not symmetric, as (|γ̂+| 6= |γ̂−|).10
The negative estimate of γ− corroborates previous ndings about upward comparisons
reducing individuals' satisfaction, consistent with envy eects. The positive estimate of γ+
suggests a satisfaction-enhancing impact of downward comparisons, consistent with pride
9See Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) for the implications of these assumptions.
10The dierence is statistically signicant with a p-value<0.0001. Hereafter we will only report dierence-
of-means tests with large enough p-values (>0.001).
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or status eects (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). It is worth noting that γ̂+ is usually found
to be zero in linear specications (Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005)). The estimated nil eect
of downward comparisons, however, could be induced by imposing a linear G+ function.
Indeed, when we t a linear specication to our data, as in Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), we
also nd a positive but statistically insignicant γ̂+ while γ̂− is negative and statistically
signicant.11 Our results are in line with Vendrik and Woltjers (2007), who also allow for
non-linearity in G+ (and G−) and nd a positive estimate of γ+.
Table 1: Eect of Rela-
tive and Absolute Income
on Life Satisfaction
Coecient t-stat
γ− -0.13 *** -3.22
γ+ 1.75 *** 3.69
ρ− -5.09 *** -5.09
ρ+ 2.81 *** 4.08
β -0.03 *** -2.77
ρ 0.71 *** 8.70
N 1444
R2 0.08
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Fixed eect esti-
mates of equation 1. Stan-
dard errors of parameters ρ,
ρ−, and ρ+ are estimated from
bootstrapping equation 1 with
100 iterations. Controls in-
clude: Inactive dummy, unem-
ployed dummy, ln(1+working
hours), ln(age), active indi-
viduals over household mem-
bers, ln(houeshold members),
widower dummy, separated or
divorced dummy, two children
(<18) dummy, three children
dummy, more than three chil-
dren dummy, year dummy,
Montevideo dummy, constant.
Our ndings do not give support to the diminishing sensitivity hypothesis (HII). This
hypothesis postulates a convex relationship between relative income and satisfaction for
individuals with relative deprivation but a concave relationship for individuals with positive
relative income. Convexity requires parameters γ and ρ of opposite sign while concavity
is satised when parameters γ and ρ have the same sign. Our parameter estimates of γ
and ρ have the same sign at either side of the reference income (i.e. γ̂+ > 0, ρ̂+ > 0 and
γ̂− < 0, ρ̂− < 0), implying concavity both for positive relative income, as suggested by
HII, but, contrary to HII, also for relative deprivation.
11γ̂+=0.207, t-statistic=1.38
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The equal degree of convexity and concavity hypothesis (HIII) is clearly rejected, as we
nd no support for the hypothesis of diminishing sensitivity. Nonetheless, we can check
whether the degree of concavity diers at both sides of the reference income level. The
larger estimate of |ρ−| = 5.09 > 2.81 = |ρ+| suggests concavity to be larger for relative
deprivation than relative auence. A Wald test on H0 :|ρ−| > |ρ+| cannot reject the
hypothesis at 1% level.
Loss aversion is only satised for incomes that are suciently distant from the reference
income. Loss aversion required steeper slope for losses than for gains. As Figure 1 shows,
however, the slope of G− is only larger than that G+ for incomes at least 39% higher or
lower than reference income (i.e. G− = G+ > 0.39).12 In our sample, this means that
loss aversion holds for about 53% of individuals. The more local strategy to test for loss
aversion, consisting of evaluating the slope of the value function at G− = G+ = 0, indicates
that there is a jump at this point and corroborates the lack of loss aversion for incomes
close to the reference income, as (1.75 = |γ̂+| > |γ̂−| = 0.13).
Figure 1: Loss Aversion: Slope of value function for positive and negative relative incomes
Notes: The gure shows the slope of the value function for G+ and G−. ∂S/∂G− >
∂S/∂G+ for G− = G+ > 0.39. Thus, loss aversion holds for incomes at least 30.1%
higher or lower than reference income.
In sum, our ndings for Uruguay, a middle-income country, are in line with those of Vendrik
and Woltjers (2007) for Germany, a high-income country: Satisfaction is concave in positive
as well as negative relative income thus rejecting the diminishing sensitivity as well as the
equal degree of convexity and concavity hypotheses, concavity being larger for positive
relative income, and loss aversion is only satised for incomes that are suciently distant
from the reference income. We nd this relative income gap of 39% to be about three times
120.39 is the solution for G of equalizing the slopes for positive and negative relative incomes, i.e.
∂S/∂G− = ∂S/∂G+
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larger for Uruguay than the gap for Germany, reported by Vendrik and Woltjers (2007) to
be 12%.
We nally turn to the eect of absolute income. Before discussing the size of the eect, it
is worth noting that the power function parameter ρ = 0.71, which means that the data
supports our power function specication, a more exible specication than the usual log
function commonly used in previous empirical literature. The size of the marginal eect
of absolute income is negligible. Since the partial derivative of equation 1 depends on
the relative income gaps G− and G+13, Appendix Figure 2 plots the average predicted
marginal eect of absolute income for various income levels, when they are above or below
the reference group income. The marginal eect of absolute income is always very close
to zero, being smaller for relative deprivation, G− > 0, than for positive relative incomes,
G+ > 0.
4.2 Heterogeneity
Do the above conclusions, which apply on average to the whole sample, also characterize
the value function of relevant population subgroups? The literature has not devoted much
work to examine the heterogeneous eects of relative income on life satisfaction. The
existing limited evidence suggests that non-cognitive traits have a relevant inuence on
the relative income (comparisons) eect on life satisfaction (Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2017).14 This section provides further and novel evidence on how individual heterogeneity
shapes the value function. We will explore dierences that arise from the importance given
by individuals to income comparisons, from personality or non-cognitive traits, and from
fairness beliefs.
A common nding arises from all the heterogeneity analyses we undertake: the value
function is always found to be concave, as we have documented for the sample as a whole.
Thus, in what follows we are discussing mainly the dierences in slopes of the various
heterogeneous groups.
4.2.1 Importance of Income Comparisons
Comparing one's income with that of relevant others has been proven to be important.
Using data for European countries, Clark and Senik (2010) show that self-reported intensity
on the relevance of comparisons matter for individuals' life satisfaction. In particular, they
nd a negative relationship between own happiness and intensity of comparisons. That is,
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(7)
14Much the same has been found for loss aversion (Boyce et al., 2016).
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On average, the results reported in Section 4.1 suggest that life satisfaction decreases at
an increasing rate as individuals income is increasingly lower than reference income, while
it increases at a decreasing rate as individuals income is increasingly higher than reference
income. Does the value function of individuals who report that income comparisons are
important to them dier from those who feel that income comparisons are not important?
And if so, do individuals who report income comparisons to be important experience larger
or smaller changes in life satisfaction as their income moves away from the reference income?
To examine whether the value function diers for individuals who care about income com-
parisons, we use the answers to the following question: How important is it for you to
compare your income with other people's incomes? Individuals answered using a show-
card, where 1 corresponds to Not at all important, and 5 is labeled Very important.
Since only one fourth of the mass reports values greater than one, we collapse the ve-point
scale original variable into a dichotomous variable indicating high intensity, which takes
value 1 if individuals answer 2 to 5 in the original ve-point scale, and zero otherwise.
Table Appendix I.4 shows the distribution of answers to the original question.
To allow individuals with dierent income comparison intensity to have dierent value
functions, we interact the power functions of relative incomes h(G+)(I) and h(G−)(1− I)
with the indicator variable H, and estimate the following specication15:
S = α+βh(y)+γ+h(G
+)(I)+γ−h(G−)(1− I)+H[γH+ h(G+)(I)+γH− h(G−)(1− I)]+δX+e
(8)
where now, with a slight abuse of notation, parameters γ+ and γ− capture the eect of
individuals for whom comparisons are not important, while parameters γH+ and γ
H
− indicate
the dierential eect of individuals for whom comparisons are important. The overall eect
for the latter individuals is obtained from adding both parameters γ+ and γH+ (or γ− and
γH− ), as usual.
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Table 2 shows that the value function of individuals who care for income comparisons
diers from those who do not, as both γH+ and γ
H
− are signicantly dierent from zero.
The estimates show a atter value function in income losses and a steeper function in
income gains for individuals who deem income comparisons important. The value function
for relative negative income is actually entirely at, as a Wald test on H0 :γ− = γH−
cannot reject the null (F(1,704)=0.30; p-value=0.58). This means that negative relative
income does not aect life satisfaction of individuals who care for income comparisons.
One interpretation of this result is that envy and information eects are of similar size.
15Because of our limited sample size, in our estimations we restrict the curvature, captured by ρ+ and
ρ−, to be homogeneous across dierent groups. Our attempts to estimate a dierent ρ parameter per
group yield unstable and unreliable estimates.
16Note that the hypothesis H0 = γ+ = γ
H
+ = γ− = γ
H
− = 0 is rejected for all models in Section 4.2.
Likewise, hypotheses H0 = ρ+ = ρ− = 0 and H0 = ρ+ = ρ− = 1 are also rejected by the data.
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A related interpretation is that these individuals choose reference groups to balance self-
enhancement which leads to choosing reference groups that make themselves feel better
and self-improvement which entails choosing reference groups that help them improve
their performance.17 Why does then relative negative income depresses life satisfaction of
those reporting income comparisons not to be important? The explanation that derives
from the rst interpretation is that the envy eect dominates the information eect. For
some reason these individuals believe there is little to be learned from others' good fortune.
The negative eect of relative negative income for those who report that comparisons are
not important is also consistent with self-improvement motives dominating self-enhancing
aspects, which could result from these individuals being more ambitious or less complacent.
Table 2: Eect of Rela-
tive and Absolute Income
on Life Satisfaction, by In-
tensity of Comparisons
Coecient t-stat
γ− -0.26 *** -4.02
γH− 0.23 *** 3.66
γ+ 1.21 *** 2.82
γH+ 1.26 *** 2.88
ρ− -4.29 *** -3.36
ρ+ 2.21 *** 4.24
β -0.03 *** -2.75
ρ 0.71 ** 2.51
N 1444
R2 0.10
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Fixed eect esti-
mates of equation 1. Stan-
dard errors of parameters ρ,
ρ−, and ρ+ are estimated from
bootstrapping equation 1 with
100 iterations. Controls in-
clude: Inactive dummy, unem-
ployed dummy, ln(1+working
hours), ln(age), active indi-
viduals over household mem-
bers, ln(houeshold members),
widower dummy, separated or
divorced dummy, two children
(<18) dummy, three children
dummy, more than three chil-
dren dummy, year dummy,
Montevideo dummy, constant.
The larger (positive) eect of positive relative income of individuals who nd income com-
17Yet another possibility is that the reference group we have chosen, i.e. neighbours, is not the relevant
one for them. However, residential choice is endogenous, we are condent to discard this possibility.
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parisons important, relative to those who do not nd them important can be interpreted
as status or self-enhancing eects being larger for individuals who compare.
The dierent slope of the value function between those who compare and those who do
not implies that the dierence in life satisfaction between these two types of individuals
increases as relative income increases. This is to the best of our knowledge novel evidence.18
4.2.2 Personality Traits
In this section we report heterogeneity by three personality traits, locus of control, self-
ecacy, and self-esteem, which are indicators of a common construct termed 'core self-
evaluations' (Judge et al., 2002).19 Almlund et al. (2011) dene positive self-evaluation as
indicating a generally positive and proactive view of oneself and one's relationship to the
world.
Locus of control measures the extent to which individuals perceive that the control of their
life is external (depends on others, luck, etc.) or internal (the course of own life depends
on own decisions and eort); self-esteem is usually conceived of as the perception that
individuals have about their own ability; while self-ecacy captures the belief that one
can act eectively to bring about desired results.
Out of these three personality traits, locus of control is the non-cognitive skill which has
captured most attention amongst economist. A rapidly increasing stock of literature exam-
ines the extent to which locus of control, which is rather stable for adults (Cobb-Clark and
Schurer, 2013), provides helpful insights in our understanding of relevant economic out-
comes and behaviours, such as education attainment (Almlund et al., 2011), labour market
outcomes (Cobb-Clark, 2015), health status (Cobb-Clark et al., 2014), savings behaviour
(Cobb-Clark et al., 2016), individual's well-being (Verme, 2009), poverty (Bernheim et
al., 2015), social behaviour (Heckman et al., 2006), and economic preferences (Becker et
al., 2012). There is more paucity of studies using either self-esteem or self-ecacy. Still,
self-esteem has been also found to be relevant for labour market outcomes, notably earn-
ings (Drago, 2011), education (de Araujo and Lagos, 2013), and health (Trzesniewski et
al., 2006), while self-ecacy correlates positively with educational attainment (Behncke,
2009), risk attitudes (Krueger and Dickson, 1994), and pro-social behaviour (Caprara et
al., 2010)
We measure locus of control with the Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance (IPC) scale
(Levenson, 1981).20. Our external locus of control indicator combines the answers to two
18Clark and Senik (2010), for instance, use an empirical strategy that only allows them to identify the
eect of relative income at the average relative income level.
19The direct eect of these time-invariant personality traits on life satisfaction is subsumed in the xed
eect.
20Levenson's scale has been previously used in economics, e.g. Tanguy et al. (2014), and builds on
earlier work by Rotter et al. (1966), which is the scale many economists have employed and which can be
found in large data sets, such as the German SOEP or the Australian HILDA. Unlike Rotter's, however,
Levenson's scale considers more than one dimension, which has been argued to better capture beliefs about
control (Lefcourt, 1991)
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questions. In the rst one respondents choose their position in a 5-point scale, where 1 is
everything is determined by destiny or external forces and 5 we make our own destiny,
while in the second one individuals report about their perceived power today, ve years
ago, and bout the power of their neighbours, in a 9-point scale.21
The indicator variable for high self-ecacy takes value 1 if individuals answer that they
are responsible for changes in their live when asked who will contribute more to a change
in your live?, while takes value 0 when answering either of the other six options, including
their family, the State, God, local government, other groups of people or another person.
We use two dierent indicator variables for self-esteem that measure low self-esteem. The
rst one takes value 1 if individuals report having very often at least one of the following
feelings: stupid, ridicule, ashamed, or humiliated, while it takes value 0 otherwise, while
the second one takes value 1 if individuals report having very often at least one of the
following feelings: was treated unfairly, was humiliated, was treated disrespectfully, being
sickening, while it takes value 0 otherwise Table Appendix I.1 shows the exact wording
of the questions and the possible answers.
As Table 3 shows, the value function is atter for external individuals, in the range of
relative deprivation, but steeper in the range of relative advantage. In other words, income
losses aect externals less than internals, but the former derive higher satisfaction from
income gains.
Table 3: Eect of Relative and Absolute Income on Life Satisfaction, by Core Self-Evaluation
Personality Traits
External LOC High Self-Ecacy Low Self-esteem (1) Low Self-esteem (2)
Coecient t-stat Coecient t-stat Coecient t-stat Coecient t-stat
γ− -0.08 *** -3.40 -0.06 -1.43 -0.12 *** -3.63 -0.20 *** -4.15
γH− 0.06 ** 2.01 -0.08 ** -2.06 0.08 ** 2.46 0.14 *** 3.20
γ+ 1.34 *** 2.22 1.91 *** 3.10 1.40 *** 2.77 1.33 *** 2.66
γH+ 2.38 *** 2.86 -0.17 -0.33 1.05 ** 2.09 1.17 ** 2.48
ρ− -6.09 *** -7.01 -5.29 *** 10.23 -5.49 *** -6.98 -4.89 ** -2.25
ρ+ 3.41 *** 3.45 2.81 *** 4.00 2.81 *** 2.93 2.81 1.36
β -0.02 *** -2.51 -0.03 *** -2.81 -0.02 ** -2.58 -0.03 *** -2.80
ρ 0.71 *** 8.70 0.71 *** 4.35 0.71 *** 4.35 0.71 ** 2.17
N 1444 1444 1444 1444
R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed eect estimates of equation 1. Standard errors of parameters
ρ, ρ−, and ρ+ are estimated from bootstrapping equation 1 with 100 iterations. Controls include: Inactive
dummy, unemployed dummy, ln(1+working hours), ln(age), active individuals over household members,
ln(household members), widower dummy, separated or divorced dummy, two children (<18) dummy, three
children dummy, more than three children dummy, year dummy, Montevideo dummy, constant.
The results for the other two core self-evaluation variables, shown in columns 2 to 4 of
Table 3, are very consistent with those of locus of control. The results from columns 3 and
21The variable we use in the analysis is the union of two indicator variables, which capture exter-
nality/chance and low power, respectively. Externality/chance takes value 1 if the average answer of
individuals over the two waves is less than four, while low power takes value 1 if if the average answer of
individuals over the three questions (own power today, own power ve years ago, and neighbour's power)
is less than ve.
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4 also suggest that individuals with high self-esteem obtain larger satisfaction gains from
increasing relative negative income. As for locus of control, self-esteem is also relevant
for individuals with positive relative income. Now, high self-esteem individuals show a
atter value function. Our ndings, thus suggest that internality and high self-esteem
have asymmetric eects on both sides of the reference income: The fall in satisfaction from
an income decrease when the individual is relatively deprived is larger than the increase in
satisfaction from an income increase of the same size when her relative income is positive.
Finally, self-ecacy is only relevant for relative negative income, and individuals with high
self-ecacy obtain a satisfaction premium from increments in relative income, relative to
low-self ecacy individuals.
4.2.3 Social Beliefs
People's beliefs about how society works are important drivers of individuals' preferences
and behaviour. In this section we focus on fairness beliefs and exploit answers to two ques-
tions on beliefs about there being discrimination in society. To interpret the role of fairness
beliefs we draw on the concept of Belief in a just world (BJW), where people generally
get what they deserve, introduced by Lerner (1965, 1980) in psychology.22 Believing in
a just world serves to combat the idea that one's fate is largely random and provides a
feeling of self-determination and control over one's destiny. It is then no surprise that BJW
has been shown to correlate with locus of control (Furnham, 2003), and to enhance mental
health and self-esteem (Dalbert, 1999). The belief in self-reliance or self-suciency that is
related to BJW may imply that those individuals who perceive less or no discrimination
have a steeper value function than those who do. In other words, people who see their
relative income improve get a satisfaction premium that may result from believing that
they are mostly responsible for such improvement. Analogously, the extra depression in
satisfaction experienced by those who see their relative income decrease may be due to
their belief that the income reduction is mostly due to their actions.
To examine the extent to which fairness beliefs aect individuals' value function, we use
two dummy variables that measure whether individuals perceive that society discriminates
either by social origin or by ethnic origin. Social discrimination by social (ethnic) origin
takes value one if respondents agree that social (ethnic) origin hinders at least one of the
following: the chance of getting a job, access to services, access to education, getting a
contract with the government, and it takes value 0 otherwise.
Consistent with the concept of BJW and the ensuing self-determination beliefs, the esti-
mates of Table 4 show a atter value function in negative relative income for individuals
who perceive social discrimination either by social or ethnic origin. As expected, these
results are in line with our previous ndings by locus of control. For positive relative in-
22The economics literature has embedded BJW and fairness perceptions in political economy models to
explain redistributive politics, tax policy, and economic growth (Alesina et al., 2012; Bénabou and Tirole,
2006; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
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comes, however, the value function of those who perceive no or little discrimination is only
steeper for one of the indicator variables used.
Table 4: Eect of Relative and Absolute Income
on Life Satisfaction, by Social Beliefs
Social Origin Ethnic Origin
Discrimination Discrimination
Coecient t-stat Coecient t-stat
γ− -0.34 *** -4.08 -0.37 *** -4.83
γH− 0.14 ** 2.05 0.24 *** 4.00
γ+ 2.00 *** 3.71 0.90 * 1.80
γH+ -0.56 -1.34 1.10 *** 2.73
ρ− -4.89 *** -3.64 -4.09 *** -10.04
ρ+ 2.61 *** 3.13 2.41 *** 4.00
β -0.03 *** -3.01 -0.03 *** -2.83
ρ 0.71 *** 4.72 0.71 *** 8.70
N 1444 1444
R2 0.10 0.11
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed eect
estimates of equation 1. Standard errors of parameters
ρ, ρ−, and ρ+ are estimated from bootstrapping equation
1 with 100 iterations. Controls include: Inactive dummy,
unemployed dummy, ln(1+working hours), ln(age), active
individuals over household members, ln(household mem-
bers), widower dummy, separated or divorced dummy, two
children (<18) dummy, three children dummy, more than
three children dummy, year dummy, Montevideo dummy,
constant.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper contributes new evidence to the literature on how individuals value their situ-
ation in relation to a reference group, evaluating the validity of the basic assumptions of
prospect theory, for a middle-income country. In line with previous evidence, our ndings
suggest that income comparisons within a relevant social group matter and are more im-
portant for people with negative relative income than for individuals whose income is larger
than the reference income. A substantial body of evidence imposes a linear function for
relative incomes and nds a nil eect of relative income for downward comparisons (e.g.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Contrary to this evidence, when we allow for non-linearities
by means of a power function, the eect of downward comparisons turns to be positive,
suggesting that the nil eect may be induced by the linear specication of previous studies.
The value function describing the relationship between relative income and life satisfaction
is found to be concave for positive relative incomes, and contrary to the principle of dimin-
ishing sensitivity of prospect theory, as well for negative relative incomes. Loss aversion,
which requires steeper slope of the value function for negative relative incomes than for
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positive ones, is only satised for incomes that are suciently distant from the reference
income (i.e. at least 30.1% higher or lower).
The importance given by individuals to income comparisons, their personality traits and
social beliefs aect the slope of the value function, mostly for negative relative incomes. In-
dividuals reporting income comparisons not to be important show a steeper value function.
Dierent arguments may explain this nding: the envy eect dominates the information
eect, or self-improvement motives dominate self-enhancing aspects. Internal locus of con-
trol, high self-ecacy, and high self-esteem traits that indicate a positive and proactive
view of oneself and one's relationship to the world also show steeper value functions.
This satisfaction premium to income increases may result from their believe in them be-
ing responsible for their economic success. Moreover, these three personality traits have
asymmetric eects on both sides of the reference income: The fall in satisfaction from an
income decrease when the individual is relatively deprived is larger than the increase in
satisfaction from an income increase of the same size when her relative income is positive.
Finally, and consistent with the concept of Belief in a just world (Lerner, 1965 and 1980),
individuals who do not perceive social discrimination also show a steeper value function.
The value function for experienced utility in Uruguay shares basic characteristics with that
in Germany: Comparisons are asymmetric, the value function is concave, and loss aversion
holds for incomes not too close to the reference income. However, the incidence of loss
aversion and the degree of concavity in negative and positive relative income dier in the
two countries. Loss aversion holds for incomes that are two and a half times further away
from relative income in Uruguay than in Germany. Concavity of the value function is also
larger in Uruguay, both for negative and positive relative incomes. As outlined below, this
has implications for eort decisions and aggregate economic mobility.
The concave value function for relative deprivation, which conforms with standard eco-
nomic theory, can be explained by increasing costs of social participation as the relative
gap between own income and reference income widens up (Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007).
According to this interpretation, then, the more concave value function in Uruguay implies
that the costs of social participation increase more rapidly in Uruguay than in Germany.
Our heterogeneity analysis also shows that such costs are not homogeneous across the
board, but are higher for internal individuals, those with high self-ecacy and high self-
esteem.
Our nding of a concave, as opposed to convex, value function for relative deprivation, may
also be explain by our mistaken choice of reference group for each individual. Reference
groups are endogenously chosen by individuals in a non-trivial way, for self-enhancing or
self-improvement purposes, for instance. We have tried to minimize the error when esti-
mating reference incomes by exploiting endogenous residential choices and the perception
error of an individual's own relative position in the income distribution, which introduces
heterogeneity within groups of individuals who share the same observable characteristics.
Notwithstanding this, if we still were estimating upwardly biased reference incomes, we
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would obtain a concave relationship between life satisfaction and relative income, even
when the true relationship were convex, as predicted by prospect theory. Substantial
further work in dening the correct reference group and estimating the correct reference
income is clearly needed if we want to be entirely certain that these issues do not aect
the estimated shape of the value function.
The concavity or convexity of life satisfaction in relative concern has important economic
implications, as it inuences individuals' behaviour (Clark and Oswald, 1998) and eort
decisions (Leites and Ramos, 2015; Goette et al., 2004). In order to understand the
importance of reference groups on intergenerational mobility, Leites and Ramos (2017)
model eort decisions of rational agents from dierent social origins, who choose the level
of eort that maximizes their expected utility. They show that when facing suciently large
relative deprivation people get discouraged and respond by reducing their eort, if relative
concern is convex. However, if the value function is concave, suciently large relative
deprivation encourage individuals to increase their eort. The former reaction enhances
intergenerational persistence, while the latter reduces intergenerational poverty traps and
contributes to increased mobility. In an earlier modelling of individual behaviour when
relative concerns matter, Clark and Oswald (1998) show that the concavity or convexity of
the utility function in relative concern is key to understand people's following or deviant
behaviour. Applied to relative deprivation and eort decisions, the concavity of the life
satisfaction function found for Uruguay implies that reference groups will induce people
to increase their eort. Once again this eect proofs to be heterogeneous, being larger for
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Table Appendix I.1: Denition of the variables
Variable Variable denition Source/years
Life satisfaction Categorical variable, 1 very dissatised, 5 very satised MWTC
2006/11
Household income Log(1+real household income); July 2012 prices
MWTC
2006/11
Age Age of the respondent
Sex Male = 1; Female = 0
Inactive Inactive = 1; Otherwise = 0
Unemployed Unemployed = 1; Otherwise = 0
Household
members
Log(number of members in the household)
Active household
members
Log(Number of labor active members in the
household)/Log(number of members in the household)
Widow Widow = 1; Otherwise = 0
Separated/Divorced Separated/Divorced = 1; Otherwise = 0
Working hours Log(1+respondent's working hours)
Two children (Household has 2 children or less) = 1; Otherwise = 0;
Children <18 year old
Three children (Household has 3 children) = 1; Otherwise = 0; Children <18
year old
Four+ children (Household has 4 children or more) = 1; Otherwise = 0;
Children <18 year old
Y rgi Mean reference group income. Reference group dened by
neighbourhood of residence
PPi Perceived income decile of respondent
PTi Objective (estimated) income decile of respondent CHS
2006/11
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Denitions of the variables (cont)
Variable Variable denition Source/years
High Intensity of
Comparisons
Equals 1 if individual answers 2 to 5 to the following question:
How important is it for you to compare your income with
other people's incomes?, where 1 is Not at all important
and 5 is Very important; and equals 0 otherwise
MWTC
2006/11
External LOC Equals 1 if the following two indicator variables take value 1.
First, externality/chance takes value 1 if the average answer of
individuals to the following question over the two waves is less
than four: Some believe that people can build their own
future, while others believe it is not possible to escape one's
luck. Other people believe in both. Please tell me which of the
following options captures better your own beliefs about this:
(1) Everything is determined by destiny or external forces
(2) Mostly by destiny (3) Half by destiny and half by own
decisions (4) Mostly by myself (5) We make our own
destiny. Second, powerful others takes value 1 if the average
answer of individuals over the following three questions is less
than ve: Suppose a ladder of nine steps: the powerless are on
the lower step, while those with a lot of power are on the
highest step. According to you, (a) On what step are you
located now?, (b) On what step are your neighbours located?,
(c) On what step were you located ve years ago?
High Self-Ecacy Equals 1 if individuals answer that they are responsible for
changes in their live when asked Who will contribute more to
a change in your live?, and equals 0 when answering either of
the other six options, including their family, the State, God,
local government, other groups of people or another person
High Self-Esteem
(1)
Equals 1 if individuals report having very often at least one of
the following feelings: stupid, ridicule, ashamed, or
humiliated, and equals 0 otherwise
High Self-Esteem
(2)
Equals 1 if individuals report having very often at least one of
the following feelings: was treated unfairly, was humiliated,




Equals 1 if respondents agree that social origin hinders at least
one of the following: the chance of getting a job, access to
services, access to education, getting a contract with the
government, and equals 0 otherwise
Ethnic Origin
Discrimination
Equals 1 if respondents agree that ethnic origin hinders at
least one of the following: the chance of getting a job, access
to services, access to education, getting a contract with the
government, and equals 0 otherwise
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Table Appendix I.2: Distribution of Error Perceptions by Average Income of the Reference Group
Reference group Average income (pesos) Understate (%) Get it right (%) Overstate (%)
Poorest 20,066 10% 5% 85%
20,433 6% 8% 87%
22,032 8% 12% 80%
22,335 0% 17% 83%
22,774 13% 19% 69%
23,644 4% 14% 82%
23,849 10% 8% 82%
32,023 15% 13% 72%
35,354 23% 10% 67%
38,548 25% 18% 57%
39,404 43% 10% 48%
Richest 53,489 40% 18% 42%
Notes: Reference groups are neighbourhoods of residency. The column entitled "Understate" shows the percentage
of individuals from a given reference group who reported having a lower social position than her actual one. The
other two columns can be interpreted in an analogous manner. That is, rows add up to 100%
Table Appendix I.3: Descriptive Statistics and Dierences of Means Tests
Cross-section sample Panel sample t-test (Cross-section sample) (Panel sample) t-test
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
Life satisfaction 3.84 0.79 3.77 1.03 0.97 3.84 0.83 3.74 1.04 0.67
log(1+household income) 9.82 0.99 9.91 0.83 0.41 9.86 0.93 9.97 0.77 0.25
Years of education 8.89 3.72 8.94 3.77 0.12 9.23 3.92 9.45 3.60 0.03
Unemployment 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.88 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.36
log(Active household members) 1.78 0.91 1.84 0.95 0.68 1.76 0.88 1.86 0.93 0.75
log(Household members) 1.54 0.35 1.51 0.42 0.87 1.53 0.34 1.51 0.35 0.82
Log age 3.59 0.22 3.74 0.20 0.67 3.58 0.21 3.71 0.19 0.00
Male 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.21 0.00
log (1+working hours) 2.40 1.76 2.69 1.69 0.00 2.07 1.77 2.63 1.61 0.57
Marital status 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.74 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.77
Log (number of children) 1.09 0.34 0.50 0.55 0.70 1.08 0.34 0.49 0.50 0.83
Neighborhood income 28334 11557 27893 9781 0.07 27187 10882 27737 9351 0.80
N 556 722 348 722
Notes: The null hypothesis of the t-tests is that sample means of the panel sample and the cross-section sample are equal.
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Table Appendix I.4: How important is it for you to compare your income with other
people's income?
Answer N %




Very important 5 53 7.34
N 722 100
Table Appendix I.5: Eect of Relative and Abso-
lute Income on Life Satisfaction. Full estimates.
Coecient t-stat
γ− -0.13 *** -3.22
γ+ 1.75 *** 3.69
ρ− -5.09 *** -5.09
ρ+ 2.81 *** 4.08
β -0.03 *** -2.77
ρ 0.71 *** 8.70
Inactive -0.02 -0.17
Unemployed -0.29 * -1.70
Ln(1+working hours) -0.06 -1.60
Ln(age) -0.27 -0.67
Active household members 0.97 *** 3.38
Ln(Household members) 0.01 0.28
Widower -0.51 -1.61
Separated/divorced -0.21 ** -1.97
Two children (<18 yrs.) 0.14 1.14
Three children (<18 yrs.) 0.13 0.78
Four+ children (<18 yrs.) 0.23 0.93
Year -0.04 -0.63
Montevideo 0.85 ** 2.47
Constant 5.28 *** 3.55
N 1444
R2 0.08
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed eect es-
timates of equation 1. This table reports the full set of
estimates of our baseline model. The key parameters are
also shown in Table 1. Standard errors of parameters ρ, ρ−,
and ρ+ are estimated from bootstrapping equation 1 with
100 iterations. The variable Active household members is
dened relative to the overall household members.
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Figure 2: Marginal eect of absolute income for positive and negative relative incomes
Notes: Relative deprivation if y < yrg and relative auence if y > yrg. The derivatives are
shown in equation 7.
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